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Abstract—This study uses 5-bus and 30-bus test cases to ex-
plore ISO net surplus (congestion rent) collections and allocations
in wholesale power markets with grid congestion managed by
locational marginal prices (LMPs). Price-sensitivity of demand
and generator learning capabilities are taken as experimental
treatment factors. A key finding is that conditions resulting in
greater generator capacity withholding, hence higher and more
volatile LMPs, also result in greater ISO net surplus collections
that can be substantial in size. A key conclusion is that ISO net
surplus collections should be used pro-actively to mitigate the
conditions encouraging generator capacity withholding and hence
high and volatile LMPs rather than to provide ex post support
for LMP payment offsets and LMP volatility risk hedging as is
currently the norm.
Index Terms—Wholesale power market, locational marginal
pricing, ISO net surplus (congestion rent), efficiency, welfare,
learning, demand-bid price sensitivity, AMES Testbed
I. INTRODUCTION
AS elaborated in [1], over 50% of electric power gener-ation in the U.S. is now traded at wholesale using cen-
trally managed locational marginal prices (LMPs). Under this
pricing scheme, a not-for-profit Independent System Operator
(ISO) uses the solutions of suitably formulated bid/offer-based
optimal power flow (OPF) problems to price electric power in
accordance with the location and timing of its injection into
or withdrawal from the transmission grid.
Roughly, an LMP at a particular grid location is the least
cost to the system of servicing an additional increment of
demand (load) at that location.1 Congestion arising on any
grid branch necessarily results in separation between the LMPs
at two or more pricing locations. Ideally, persistent LMP
separation should encourage energy supply to be offered when
and where it has the greatest value, encourage energy demand
to be bid when and where it can be serviced most cheaply,
and signal where transmission enhancements should be made
to relieve grid congestion in the longer run [4].
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1More precisely, as carefully explained in [2], the LMP at a particular bus
k is the dual variable (shadow price) corresponding to the balance constraint
ensuring the satisfaction of Kirchhoff’s current law at bus k. Consequently,
given certain regularity conditions, it can be expressed as the change in the
optimized OPF objective function with respect to a change in fixed demand
at bus k. As discussed and illustrated in [3], LMPs are conceptually distinct
from “competitive market clearing prices.”
As is well-known, however, given branch and generation
capacity limits, the physical laws regulating the flow of power
on non-radial transmission grids can result in counter-intuitive
LMP separation outcomes ( [5], [6, Chp. 6]). For example,
LMPs at the two ends of a branch can separate without the
branch being congested, power can flow from higher to lower
price locations, and the price at a load-only location can be
strictly higher or strictly lower than the marginal cost of any
marginal (non-capacity-constrained) generation unit.
Another important LMP separation outcome is the creation
of a net earnings stream that is distinct from buyer and seller
net surplus.2 When LMPs separate across the grid, the prices
paid by wholesale buyers can diverge from the prices paid to
wholesale sellers. The difference between total buyer payments
and total seller receipts is a net earnings stream collected and
allocated by the ISO. Hereafter these ISO collections will be
referred to as ISO net surplus.3
Previous research has shown that ISO net surplus is nec-
essarily non-negative under standard DC-OPF formulations
for the determination of LMP and dispatch levels in ISO-
managed wholesale power markets; see [8, Prop. 2.1]. Simula-
tion findings in [5, Fig. 11] demonstrate the strong sensitivity
of ISO net surplus to variations in the limits constraining
branch power flows. To date, however, the sensitivity of ISO
net surplus to variations in more general structural conditions
does not appear to have been systematically examined.
This study uses the AMES Wholesale Power Market
Testbed [9] to investigate how ISO net surplus varies in
response to changes in the price-sensitivity of demand and the
learning capabilities of generation companies in ISO-operated
wholesale power markets with congestion managed by LMP.
Also investigated are the effects of these changes on market
2Roughly, net surplus refers to benefits minus costs. This standard economic
concept is more rigorously defined in Section II-B, below; see also the detailed
discussions in [3], [7]. Economists distinguish types of net surplus, e.g.,
buyer versus seller, by which type of agent initially collects the net surplus,
regardless of its subsequent allocation.
3When grids are modeled as lossless, LMP separation only arises in the
presence of congestion and the net surplus collected and allocated by the ISO
is then sometimes referred to as congestion rent. Another term occasionally
used is merchandising surplus. In economics, however, “rent” has the precise
meaning of a payment directly received by a resource in excess of the amount
needed to retain that resource in its current productive use; and the qualifier
“merchandising” suggests collection through merchant trades (i.e., through
purely private business transactions). The use of the terms “congestion rent”
and “merchandising surplus” are therefore avoided in this study.
2efficiency and the welfare of market participants.4 In addition,
we consider the social efficiency and welfare implications of
the allocation of ISO net surplus collections to other parties.5
Standard market efficiency analysis considers the extent
to which buyers and sellers participating in a single market
succeed in extracting maximum possible total net surplus from
this market. This analysis is increasingly being applied to
the study of power markets; see, e.g., [10]– [13]. However,
the standard market efficiency analysis does not consider the
possibility that an agency tasked with clearing the market,
here the ISO, is able to collect net surplus along with buyers
and sellers. This feature appears to raise potential conflict of
interest issues even if ISOs are required to allocate their net
surplus collections to other parties. Moreover, the standard
market efficiency analysis does not consider the more com-
prehensive issues of social efficiency and welfare.
In AMES(V2.05), used in this study, the ISO manages a
day-ahead energy market participated in by wholesale buyers
called Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) and wholesale sellers
called Generation Companies (GenCos). As explained more
carefully in Section II and Appendix A, the ISO uses stan-
dard bid/offer-based DC-OPF to determine hourly LMP and
dispatch levels for this market.
As detailed in Section III, systematic experiments are con-
ducted using multi-period versions of a commonly used 5-bus
ISO training case and a standard IEEE 30-bus test case. Two
treatment factors are selected for the experimental design. The
first treatment factor is the degree to which the LSEs report
fixed versus price-sensitive demand bids to the ISO for the
day-ahead energy market, an increasingly important issue as
pressures increase for more demand response in wholesale
power markets [14]–[16]. The second treatment factor is the
degree to which the GenCos can learn to report higher-than-
true marginal costs to the ISO for the day-ahead energy
market, i.e., to exercise economic capacity withholding. Even
with 100% fixed demand, economic capacity withholding can
cause market inefficiency (reductions in total net surplus) if it
results in the out-of-merit-order dispatch of costlier generation.
Moreover, it can also affect the distribution of total net surplus
among LSEs, GenCos, and the ISO.
Experimental findings are reported in Section IV. Some
amount of congestion arises in all treatments, leading to LMP
separation. However, all treatment outcomes are carefully
compared against benchmark cases, so that changes in market
outcomes can be fully attributed to changes in treatment
factors. A key finding is that ISO and GenCo net surplus
are both enhanced in treatments unfavorable to market effi-
ciency. Specifically, price-sensitivity and learning treatments
4In standard economic usage, efficiency refers to non-wastage of resources
typically measured by the size of the total net surplus resulting from resource
usage. In contrast, welfare refers to the well-being of persons often practically
measured by the distribution of the total net surplus resulting from resource
usage.
5Economists standardly measure social efficiency in terms of the current and
future non-wastage of resources for a society as a whole. Social efficiency is
distinct from social welfare, typically measured in terms of the current and
future well-being of the people populating a society in their roles as consumers
of final goods and services. Social efficiency is necessary but not sufficient
for the maximization of social welfare, since the latter requires an appropriate
resource distribution in addition to resource non-wastage.
resulting in greater GenCo economic capacity withholding,
hence higher and more volatile LMPs, also result in greater
ISO and GenCo net surplus collections. These collections are
particularly large when LSE demand bids take the form of
100% fixed (price-insensitive) demands.
All else equal, the LSEs are the big losers in the treatments
unfavorable to market efficiency. For example, with 100%
fixed demand, moving from no-learning to learning GenCos
results in a substantial increase in both ISO and GenCo
net surplus even though total net surplus decreases due to
out-of-merit-order generation dispatch. This decrease in total
net surplus reflects the substantial drop in LSE net surplus.
However, if LSEs resell their wholesale energy purchases to
downstream retail customers at regulated prices adjusted in
step with wholesale power prices, then LSEs can recoup their
losses. In this case the costs of the resource wastage are borne
by retail consumers rather than by wholesale power market
participants.
As discussed in Section V, annual reports for U.S. wholesale
power markets operating under LMP indicate that ISO net sur-
plus collections are indeed sizable in some regions. Although
there is no mention in these reports of any legal obligation to
allocate these collections, the reports indicate they are typically
allocated as revenues to holders of financial transmission rights
(including speculators as well as GenCos and LSEs), with
some residual use as payment offsets to LSEs. Unfortunately,
although the reporting of ISO net surplus collections and
allocations has improved over the past ten years,6 data on these
activities are still not presented with sufficient disaggregation
and consistency across reports to permit detailed empirical
analyses and cross-ISO comparisons.
The final Section VI discusses the overall policy implica-
tions of our experimental findings. A brief summary of these
implications is as follows.
First, conditions resulting in greater GenCo capacity with-
holding, hence higher and more volatile LMPs, also result
in greater ISO net surplus collections that can be substantial
in size. These conditions include lower price-sensitivity of
demand and increased GenCo learning capabilities.
This positive correlation between conditions conducive to
GenCo capacity withholding and the size of ISO net surplus
collections is troublesome, not because there is abuse in
current ISO practice, but because of the potential for abuse
over time. For example, purely on financial grounds, ISOs
have an incentive to perpetuate low price-sensitivity of demand
because it provides a revenue stream whose precise allocation
is at the discretion of the ISO. An immediate step that could
be taken to alleviate concerns here is increased transparency
and consistency in the public reporting of ISO activities, a step
strongly advocated in [18, Section V.B.2].
Second, ISO net surplus collections should not simply be
used to help support LMP volatility risk hedging or to offset
high LMP payments by wholesale power market participants,
as is currently the norm. These ex post compensatory measures
do little to alter the underlying conditions that encourage
6See [17] for a heroic attempt in 2001 to estimate the ISO net surplus
(congestion rent) collected by the ISOs in New York, California, and PJM.
3Fig. 1. AMES day-ahead energy market activities during each day D.
GenCo capacity withholding and that therefore contribute to
higher and more volatile LMPs. Moreover, they do nothing to
rectify any net surplus losses experienced by retail consumers
as a result of these conditions.
Rather, ISO net surplus collections should instead be used
pro-actively to help mitigate the conditions that encourage
GenCo capacity withholding. For example, they might be
used to properly incentivize socially beneficial reductions
in congestion [13], or to support demand-response, demand
dispatch, and dynamic pricing initiatives [15], [16]. Another
possible use might be to support the timely gathering and
release of market data to appropriate outside parties (e.g.,
state commissions, university researchers) enabling additional
checks on the exercise of GenCo market power.
II. AMES TESTBED
The latest version of AMES (Agent-based Modeling of
Electricity Systems) can be freely downloaded either at [19]
or [20]. Section II-A summarizes the key features of Version
2.05 of AMES, used in this study. These key features reflect,
in simplified form, day-ahead energy market operations in the
MISO ( [21], [22]) and ISO-NE [23]; cf. Fig. 1. Section II-B
provides quantitative definitions for the net surplus amounts
collected by the AMES LSEs, GenCos, and ISO, and for
market efficiency measured in terms of total net surplus.
A. Overview of Key AMES Features
The AMES(V2.05) wholesale power market operates over
an AC transmission grid starting with hour 00 of day 1 and
continuing through hour 23 of a user-specified maximum day.
AMES includes an Independent System Operator (ISO) and a
collection of energy traders consisting of J Load-Serving Enti-
ties (LSEs) and I Generation Companies (GenCos) distributed
across the buses of the transmission grid.
The objective of the not-for-profit ISO is the maximization
of Total Net Surplus (TNS) subject to transmission constraints
and GenCo operating capacity limits. In an attempt to attain
this objective, the ISO operates a day-ahead energy market
settled by means of LMP.
The welfare of each LSE j is measured by the net earnings
it secures for itself through the purchase of power in the day-
ahead market and the resale of this power to its retail cus-
tomers. During the morning of each day D, each LSE j reports
a demand bid to the ISO for the day-ahead market for day D+1.
Each demand bid consists of two parts: fixed demand (i.e., a
24-hour load profile) to be sold downstream at a regulated
price r to its retail customers with fixed-price contracts; and
24 price-sensitive inverse demand functions, one for each hour,
reflecting the price-sensitive demand (willingness to pay) of
its retail customers with dynamic-price contracts.7
The objective of each GenCo i is to secure for itself
the highest possible net earnings each day through the sale
of power in the day-ahead market. During the morning of
each day D, each GenCo i uses its current action choice
probabilities to choose a supply offer from its action domain
ADi to report to the ISO for use in all 24 hours of the day-
ahead market for day D+1.8 Each supply offer in ADi consists
of a linear marginal cost function defined over an operating
capacity interval. GenCo i’s ability to vary its choice of a
supply offer from ADi permits it to adjust the ordinate/slope
of its reported marginal cost function and/or the upper limit
of its reported operating capacity interval in an attempt to
increase its daily net earnings.
After receiving demand bids from LSEs and supply offers
from GenCos during the morning of day D, the ISO determines
and publicly posts hourly bus LMP levels as well as LSE
cleared demands and GenCo dispatch levels for the day-ahead
market for day D+1. These hourly outcomes are determined
via Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) formu-
lated as bid/offer-based DC Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF)
problems with approximated TNS objective functions based
on reported rather than true GenCo costs.9
At the end of each day D the ISO settles the day-ahead
market for day D+1 by receiving all purchase payments from
LSEs and making all sale payments to GenCos based on the
LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1, collecting any
difference as ISO net surplus. As will be clarified in Sec-
tion II-B, this ISO net surplus is guaranteed to be nonnegative
7The LSEs in AMES(V2.05) have no learning capabilities; LSE demand
bids are user-specified at the beginning of each simulation run. However, as
explained more carefully in [9], AMES(V2.05) includes a learning module,
JReLM, that can be used to implement a wide variety of stochastic reinforce-
ment learning methods for decision-making agents. Extension to include LSE
learning is planned for future AMES releases.
8Whether GenCos are permitted to report only one supply offer or 24 supply
offers for use in the day-ahead energy market varies from one energy region
to another. For example, the ISO-NE permits only one supply offer whereas
MISO permits 24 separate supply offers. Baldick and Hogan [24, pp. 18-20]
conjecture that imposing limits on the ability of GenCos to report distinct
hourly supply offers could reduce their ability to exercise market power.
9A technical presentation of the bid/offer-based DC-OPF problem formula-
tion for the ISO in AMES(V2.05) is provided in Appendix A. The solutions to
these DC-OPF problems takes the form of “supply function equilibria” rather
than market clearing outcomes based on single-point bids and offers; see [25].
As will be seen in Section II-B, the GenCos do not incur start-up/shut-down
or no-load costs and do not face ramp rate constraints. Consequently, the ISO
in AMES(V2.05) does not undertake Security-Constrained Unit Commitment
(SCUC). In future AMES versions the user will be able to specify these types
of unit commitment costs and constraints for GenCos and to have the ISO
undertake SCUC and SCED in tandem to determine GenCo commitments and
dispatch levels.
4and, under congested grid conditions, will typically be strictly
positive due to the separation of bus LMPs and the dispersion
of the GenCos and LSEs across the various bus locations.
Each GenCo i at the end of each day D uses a stochastic
reinforcement learning algorithm to update the action choice
probabilities currently assigned to the supply offers in its
action domain ADi, taking into account its day-D settlement
payment (“reward”). In particular, if GenCo i’s supply offer on
day D results in a relatively good reward, GenCo i increases
the probability it will choose to report this same supply offer
on day D+1, and conversely.10
There are no system disturbances (e.g., weather changes) or
shocks (e.g., line outages). Consequently, the dispatch levels
determined on each day D for the day-ahead energy market for
day D+1 are carried out as planned without need for settlement
of differences in the real-time energy market for day D+1.
B. Total Net Surplus and Market Efficiency
In AMES(V2.05), total net surplus (TNS) is the sum of
LSE, GenCo, and ISO net surplus. As detailed in Appendix A,
for each hour H of the day-ahead energy market the ISO
attempts to solve a standard bid/offer-based DC-OPF problem
involving the maximization of TNS subject to power-flow
balance constraints, transmission branch limits, and GenCo
capacity constraints.11 However, in GenCo learning treatments
the ISO has to construct its TNS objective function using
reported rather than true GenCo costs.
For later use in Sections III and IV, this subsection presents
the general parameterized AMES(V2.05) formulations for LSE
demand bids and GenCo supply offers as well as the LSE,
GenCo, and ISO total net surplus amounts realized during each
day D. The precise parameter value settings used in specific
experiments are explained in Section III below.
For each day D, LSE j’s demand bid for hour H of the
day-ahead market for day D+1 consists of a fixed demand for
power, pFLj(H,D), to be sold downstream at a regulated price
r ($/MWh) to its retail customers with fixed-price contracts,
and a linear price-sensitive inverse demand function
FjHD(pSLj) = cj(H,D)− 2dj(H,D)pSLj ($/MWh) (1)
defined over a power purchase interval
0 ≤ pSLj ≤ SLMaxj(H,D) (MW ) (2)
The expression FjHD(pSLj) in (1) denotes LSE j’s purchase
reservation value for energy evaluated at pSLj , i.e., the maxi-
mum dollar amount it is truly willing to pay per MWh, which
in turn reflects the willingness-to-pay of its retail customers
with dynamic-price contracts.
Suppose LSE j, located at bus k(j), is cleared at a to-
tal demand level pLj(H,D) = [pFLj(H,D)+p
S
Lj(H,D)] at price
LMPk(j)(H,D) for hour H of the day-ahead market for day
10A complete technical description of the stochastic reinforcement learning
algorithm used for GenCo learning is provided in Appendix B.
11As will be seen below, when all demand is fixed (i.e., price insensitive),
the maximization of TNS is equivalent to the minimization of GenCo total
avoidable costs.
D+1. The payments of LSE j for all 24 hours of day D+1,
settled at the end of day D, are
Payj(D) =
23∑
H=00
LMPk(j)(H,D) · pLj(H,D) ($) (3)
Using standard market efficiency analysis [3], the net sur-
plus accruing to the “last” MW of power sold by LSE j to
its dynamic-price retail customers, evaluated at any total sale
quantity p, is given by [FjHD(p)−pi] + [pi−LMPk(j)(H,D)],
where pi denotes the price charged by LSE j for this last MW.
The first bracketed term is the net surplus portion accruing
to the retail customers and the second bracketed term is the
net surplus portion accruing to LSE j. For simplicity, it will
hereafter be supposed that LSE j is able to extract all net
surplus from its dynamic-price retail customers by charging
these customers their maximum willingness to pay for each
purchased MW, i.e., by setting pi = FjHD(p) at each power
level p.12 It follows that the gross surplus for LSE j realized
on day D is given by the revenue ($) amount
GSj(D) =
23∑
H=00
[r ·pFLj(H,D)+
∫ pSLj(H,D)
0
FjHD(p)dp] (4)
The LSE net surplus realized on day D is then
LSENetSur(D) =
J∑
j=1
[
GSj(D)− Payj(D)
]
($) (5)
For each day D, the supply offer chosen by GenCo i to
report to the ISO for use in each hour H of the day-ahead
market for day D+1 consists of a linear reported marginal
cost function
MCRiD(pGi) = a
R
i (D) + 2b
R
i (D)pGi ($/MWh) (6)
defined over an operating capacity interval
CapLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapUi (MW ) (7)
for the generation of power pGi. The expression MCRiD(pGi)
in (6) denotes GenCo i’s reported sale reservation value for
energy evaluated at pGi, i.e., the minimum dollar amount it
reports it is willing to accept per MWh. The reported marginal
cost functions (6) can lie either on or above GenCo i’s true
marginal cost function
MCi(pGi) = ai + 2bipGi ($/MWh) (8)
At the beginning of any planning period, a GenCo’s avoid-
able costs consist of the operational costs that it can avoid by
shutting down production together with the portion of its fixed
(non-operational) costs that it can avoid by taking appropriate
additional actions such as asset re-use or re-sale. In order for
production to proceed, revenues from production should at
least cover avoidable costs. In the present study the GenCos
do not incur start-up/shut-down or no-load costs, and all of
their fixed costs are assumed to be sunk, i.e., non-avoidable.
Consequently, the avoidable cost function Cai (pGi) for each
12At the other extreme, a dynamic-price contract with pi =
LMPk(j)(H,D) would award all of the net surplus to the retail customers.
5GenCo i for any hour H is given by the integral of its true
hourly marginal cost function:
Cai (pGi) =
∫ pGi
0
MCi(p)dp = aipGi + bi[pGi]2 ($/h) (9)
where pGi satisfies (7).
Suppose GenCo i, located at bus k(i), is dispatched at level
pGi(H,D) at price LMPk(i)(H,D) for hour H of the day-ahead
market for day D+1. The revenues due to GenCo i for all 24
hours of day D+1, settled at the end of day D, are
Revi(D) =
23∑
H=00
LMPk(i)(H,D) · pGi(H,D) ($) (10)
Net earnings are defined as revenues minus avoidable costs.
Let the avoidable costs incurred by GenCo i on day D for any
hour H of day D+1 based on its day-D dispatch pGi(H,D) be
denoted by Cai (H,D). Then the net earnings of GenCo i for
all 24 hours of day D+1, realized on day D, are
NEi(D) = Revi(D)−
23∑
H=00
Cai (H,D) ($) (11)
Using standard market efficiency analysis [3], the GenCo net
surplus realized on day D is then
GenNetSur(D) =
I∑
i=1
NEi(D) ($) (12)
The ISO net surplus realized on day D is the difference
between LSE payments and GenCo revenues for the day-ahead
market for day D+1 that are settled at the end of day D. More
precisely,
ISONetSur(D) =
J∑
j=1
Payj(D)−
I∑
i=1
Revi(D) ($) (13)
Figure 2 provides a simple example of ISO net surplus
collection for a 2-bus system during a particular hour H. The
LSE at bus 2 pays LMP2 to the ISO for each MW of its cleared
fixed demand pFL . A portion M of this demand is supplied by
GenCo G1 at bus 1, who receives LMP1 per MW from the
ISO. The remaining portion [pFL -M] of this demand is supplied
by GenCo G2 at bus 2, who receives LMP2 > LMP1 per
MW from the ISO. The ISO net surplus for hour H is then
calculated to be M × [LMP2 - LMP1].
Figure 2 illustrates several important general properties of
ISO net surplus under LMP. As established in [8, Prop. 2.1],
the ISO net surplus generated in any hour under a standard
DC-OPF formulation, such as used in this study, is guaranteed
to be nonnegative. On the other hand, congestion arising
anywhere on a transmission grid necessarily results in the sep-
aration of LMPs at two or more bus locations [27]. Moreover,
the day-ahead energy purchases of each LSE and the day-
ahead energy sales of each GenCo are settled each hour in
accordance with the LMP determined at its own particular
bus location. Consequently, under congested grid conditions,
ISO net surplus will typically be strictly positive.13 These
13The qualifier “typically” is needed because, in special circumstances, a
shadow price can vanish even though its corresponding inequality constraint
holds with equality; the standard KKT-conditions do not rule this out. See
footnote 16 for the relevance of this observation to ISO net surplus calculation.
Fig. 2. Illustration of ISO net surplus collection for a simple 2-bus system
with a branch limit M restricting power flow from the cheaper GenCo G1 at
bus 1 to the load at bus 2. (Figure adapted from [26])
general ISO net surplus properties will be experimentally
demonstrated below in Section IV.
The total net surplus TNS(D) realized on day D is given by
the sum of component net surpluses as follows:
LSENetSur(D)+GenNetSur(D)+ISONetSur(D) ($) (14)
For example, TNS in Fig. 2 is the sum of the LSE net surplus
B, the GenCo G1 net surplus S1, the GenCo G2 net surplus
S2, and the ISO net surplus.
Finally, market efficiency is said to hold for day D if energy
has been dispatched during day D in such a way that the
maximum feasible amount of total net surplus TNS(D) defined
in (14) has been extracted, conditional on existing physical
conditions. For present purposes, these existing physical condi-
tions include branch reactances, branch flow limits, LSE fixed
demands, LSE reservation values, GenCo reservation values
(true marginal cost functions), and true GenCo operating
capacity limits.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Overview
This section sets out our experimental design. As will be
seen, this design permits the systematic examination of the
effects of two treatment factors – LSE demand-bid price
sensitivity and GenCo learning – on ISO net surplus, market
efficiency, and other related market outcomes.
We start with benchmark 5-bus and 30-bus test cases with
no LSE price-sensitive demand and no GenCo learning. Some
congestion arises in each of these benchmark cases, resulting
in LMP separation and a positive ISO net surplus. We then
carefully examine how ISO net surplus, market efficiency, and
other related market outcomes are affected as we incrementally
increase the amount of LSE demand-bid price sensitivity from
0% to 100% and as we endow the GenCos with learning
capabilities enabling them to strategically report their supply
offers for the day-ahead energy market. These incremental
changes in the two treatment factors affect congestion on the
grid, hence LMP separation and ISO net surplus, as well as
6many other market outcomes. However, comparisons back to
the benchmark cases permit us to fully attribute all of these
changes in market outcomes to specific changes in the two
treatment factors.
For learning treatments, sequential hourly decisions by
the LSEs, GenCos, and ISO are simulated for multiple 24-
hour days to permit us to examine the effects of GenCo
learning over time on market outcomes. To control for random
effects, we use thirty pseudo-random number seed values to
initialize thirty distinct runs, each 1000 (5-bus) or 500 (30-
bus) simulated days in length. We also calibrate each GenCo’s
learning parameter settings to its particular attributes. For
example, each GenCo i’s “initial propensity” qi(1), reflecting
its initial daily net earnings aspirations, is set in proportion to
its maximum possible daily net earnings as determined from
its action domain ADi.14
Also, for simplicity, the regulated price r ($/MWh) received
by each LSE for the resale of its fixed demand to its retail
customers under fixed-price contracts in the 5-bus and 30-bus
test case experiments is set at a high-enough level that it has no
effect on any experimental outcomes. This is the case for any
value of r that strictly exceeds all experimentally determined
LMP levels calculated without imposing any upper bound on
the LSEs’ willingness to pay for their fixed demands.
The AMES(V2.05) download [19] includes complete input
data files for all of the 5-bus and 30-bus test case experiments
reported in this study, including the 30 pseudo-random number
seed values, the action domain construction parameter values,
and the learning parameter values used for learning treatments.
B. Benchmark Test Cases
Our benchmark 5-bus test case has the following structural,
institutional, and behavioral features.
Fig. 3. Transmission grid for the benchmark 5-bus test case.
The wholesale power market operates over a 5-bus trans-
mission grid as depicted in Fig. 3, with branch reactances,
locations of LSEs and GenCos, and initial hour-0 LSE fixed
demands adopted from a 5-bus test case [29] commonly
used in ISO training manuals. True GenCo cost and capacity
14As explained in Section II-B and Appendix B, each GenCo i’s action
domain consists of finitely many marginal cost functions, each defined
over a compact operating capacity interval. This imposes an intrinsic upper
bound on attainable GenCo daily net earnings. The importance of calibrating
learning algorithms to learning environments is highlighted by the “heat
map” portrayals of GenCo net earnings outcomes under alternative learning
parameter configurations provided in [28, Section V].
attributes are as depicted in Fig. 4. GenCos range from GenCo
5, a relatively large coal-fired baseload unit with low marginal
operating costs, to GenCo 4, a relatively small gas-fired
peaking unit with relatively high marginal operating costs.
Fig. 4. GenCo true marginal cost functions and true capacity attributes for
the benchmark 5-bus test case.
LSE demand in this benchmark case is 100% fixed (no price
sensitivity). The LSE daily fixed-demand profiles are adopted
from a case study presented in Shahidehpour et al. [30, p. 296-
297]. Hourly fixed demand varies from light (hour 4:00) to
peak (hour 17:00). Finally, GenCos in this benchmark case are
non-learners, meaning they report supply offers to the ISO for
the day-ahead energy market that convey their true marginal
cost functions and true operating capacity limits.
Complete input data for our benchmark 5-bus test case are
provided in the input data file for the 5-bus test case included
in the data directory of the AMES(V2.05) download [19].
Our benchmark 30-bus test case is based on the IEEE 30-
bus test case presented in Shahidehpour et al. [30, App. D.4,
477-478] with 9 GenCos, 21 LSEs, and 41 transmission grid
branches. As in the benchmark 5-bus test case, LSE demand
bids do not exhibit price sensitivity and the GenCos are non-
learners that report their true cost and capacity attributes to the
ISO for the day-ahead energy market. Complete input data for
our benchmark 30-bus test case are provided in the input data
file for the 30-bus test case included in the data directory of
the AMES(V2.05) download [19].
C. R Measure for Demand-Bid Price Sensitivity
The price-elasticity of demand (i.e., the percentage change
in quantity demanded in response to a percentage change in
price) varies all along the plot of any linear price-sensitive
demand function such as (1). Hence, price-elasticity cannot
be used to parameterize sensitivity to price in the present
context.15
15This is also true for real-world LSE demand bids. For example, in
MISO [22, Section 5] an LSE’s price-sensitive demand bid for each hour H of
the day-ahead energy market must be submitted as a step function comprising
no more than nine price-quantity blocks. The LSE’s fixed demand must be
separately submitted as a quantity-only block.
7To investigate the effects of changes in LSE demand-bid
price sensitivity both with and without GenCo learning, we
first defined the ratio
Rj(H,D) =
SLMaxj(H,D)
[pFLj(H,D) + SLMaxj(H,D)]
(15)
The numerator of (15) denotes LSE j’s maximum potential
price-sensitive demand SLMaxj(H,D) for hour H of the day-
ahead market in day D+1; cf. (2). The denominator of (15)
denotes LSE j’s maximum potential total demand for hour H
of the day-ahead market in day D+1, i.e., the sum of its fixed
demand and maximum potential price-sensitive demand.
We next set all of the LSE fixed demands pFLj(H,D) to
their positive benchmark-case values BPFLj(H) (differing by
hour but not by day) and all of the maximum potential
price-sensitive demands SLMaxj(H,D) to their benchmark-
case value 0 to achieve a common value R=0.0 for the R
ratio (15) across all LSEs j for each H and D. We then
systematically varied the settings for pFLj(H,D) from their
positive benchmark-case values BPFLj(H) to 0 and the settings
for SLMaxj(H,D) from 0 to the positive benchmark-case
values BPFLj(H) for fixed demand so that a sequence of
common R values was achieved for the LSEs ranging from
R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive
demand).
Fig. 5. Illustration of the R ratio construction for the experimental control
of relative LSE demand-bid price sensitivity in each hour H.
Figure 5 illustrates the construction of R for the special
cases R=0.0, R=0.5, and R=1.0. Note that a positive R value
indicates the LSEs are able to exercise at least some degree of
resistance to higher prices through reductions in their quantity
demands.
To prevent confounding effects arising from changes in the
ordinate and slope values of the LSE price-sensitive demand
bids in (1), these ordinate and slope values were held fixed
across all experiments. The specific settings for these fixed
ordinate and slope values (along with all benchmark-case
values BPFLj(H) for LSE fixed demands) are provided in the
input data files for the 5-bus and 30-bus test cases included
with the AMES(V2.05) download [19].
IV. KEY FINDINGS
A. 5-Bus Benchmark-Case Findings
During a typical day D for the benchmark 5-bus test case,
the branch 1-2 connecting bus 1 to bus 2 is persistently
congested. As a result, in each hour there is complete LMP
separation across the grid.
TABLE I
HOURLY GENCO NET EARNINGS DURING A TYPICAL 24-HOUR DAY D FOR
THE BENCHMARK 5-BUS TEST CASE.
Hour GenCo 1 GenCo 2 GenCo 3 GenCo 4 GenCo 5
00 67.81 1.15 1,105.79 0.00 1,377.42
01 67.24 1.08 725.83 0.00 1,340.07
02 66.87 1.04 518.48 0.00 1,315.68
03 66.68 1.02 427.08 0.00 1,303.45
04 66.49 0.99 345.93 0.00 1,291.50
05 66.59 1.01 385.44 0.00 1,297.48
06 66.68 1.02 427.08 0.00 1,303.45
07 67.06 1.06 618.74 0.00 1,327.95
08 68.00 1.18 1,247.51 0.00 1,389.76
09 68.75 1.28 1,909.70 0.00 1,440.36
10 68.94 1.30 2,097.94 0.00 1,453.20
11 69.03 1.31 2,193.68 0.00 1,459.54
12 68.94 1.30 2,097.94 0.00 1,453.20
13 68.75 1.28 1,909.70 0.00 1,440.36
14 68.66 1.26 1,820.44 0.00 1,434.06
15 68.66 1.26 1,820.44 0.00 1,434.06
16 69.03 1.31 2,193.68 0.00 1,459.54
17 0.02 0.00 18,654.46 142.27 1,912.03
18 57.62 0.22 4,980.40 0.00 1,573.60
19 69.41 1.37 2,601.82 0.00 1,485.24
20 69.31 1.35 2,497.56 0.00 1,478.84
21 69.13 1.33 2,291.68 0.00 1,465.89
22 68.66 1.26 1,820.44 0.00 1,434.06
23 68.09 1.19 1,324.32 0.00 1,396.18
Total 1,556.41 26.58 56,016.09 142.27 34,266.94
As depicted in Table I, GenCos 1 and 2 have relatively low
net earnings in all hours and particularly in the peak-demand
hour 17. This occurs for two reasons. First, as depicted in
Fig. 3, these two GenCos are located at bus 1, hence they are
semi-islanded away from the “load pocket” at buses 2 through
4 due to the persistent congestion on branch 1-2. Second,
as seen in Fig. 4, these two GenCos have relatively small
operating capacities.
In contrast, GenCo 3 located at the load-pocket bus 3 has
relatively high net earnings in every hour, particularly in the
peak-demand hour 17. This occurs because GenCo 3 is a
pivotal supplier in most hours, meaning its relatively large
capacity is needed to meet fixed demand. Moreover, during
hour 17, GenCo 3 is dispatched at its maximum capacity and
GenCo 5 is semi-islanded from bus 3 due to the congestion
on branch 1-2. Consequently, to meet demand at bus 3 during
hour 17, the ISO needs to call upon the expensive peaking
unit, GenCo 4. This substantially spikes the LMP at bus 3 in
hour 17, and hence the net earnings of GenCo 3.
GenCo 5 is a base-load generator with large capacity and
low marginal cost that is never dispatched at its maximum
capacity. Consequently, although it is a pivotal supplier, its
net earnings remain relatively flat.
Fig. 6 presents benchmark-case hourly financial flows dur-
ing a typical day D. Note that LSE payments are persistently
higher than GenCo revenues, particularly during the peak-
demand hour 17. Consequently, ISO net surplus is persistently
positive with a spike during hour 17.
Indeed, for a typical day D for the benchmark case (R=0.0),
LSE payments are $754,919.61 and GenCo revenues are
8Fig. 6. LSE payments, GenCo revenues, ISO net surplus, and GenCo net
earnings during a typical 24-hour day D for the benchmark 5-bus test case.
$545,508.54. Consequently, ISO net surplus is $209,411.07,
which is about 2.3 times the amount $92,008.30 of GenCo
net earnings.
B. 5-Bus Net Surplus Distribution Findings with Learning and
Price-Sensitive Demand
Fig. 7. Mean outcomes for average hourly LMP values on day 1000 for
the benchmark 5-bus test case extended to include GenCo learning and LSE
demand varying from R=0.0 (100% fixed) to R=1.0 (100% price sensitive).
For each R treatment, both with and without GenCo learn-
ing, congestion persistently occurs on branch 1-2. As seen
in Fig. 7, the extension of the benchmark 5-bus test case to
include GenCo learning and price-sensitive demand results in
a substantial increase in mean LMP outcomes, particularly
for small values of R. This substantial LMP increase arises
because each GenCo i learns over time to exercise economic
capacity withholding, i.e., to submit to the ISO reported
marginal cost functions (6) that lie strictly above its true
marginal cost function (8).
This economic capacity withholding by the learning GenCos
also has dramatic effects on ISO net surplus collection. These
dramatic effects are graphically depicted in Figs. 8 and 9 and
numerically reported in Tables II and III.
Specifically, Fig. 8 and Table II present financial flows on
a typical day D for the benchmark 5-bus test case extended
to permit demand to vary from R=0.0 (100% fixed) to R=1.0
(100% price sensitive). As in the benchmark case, the GenCos
submit supply offers to the ISO that reflect their true cost and
capacity attributes. In contrast, Fig. 9 and Table III present
corresponding financial flows on day 1000 for the case in
which all five GenCos have learning capabilities enabling them
to engage in economic capacity withholding. In particular,
each GenCo applies learning to its past net earnings outcomes
in an attempt to determine which marginal cost function it
should report to the ISO to achieve its highest possible daily
net earnings.
Fig. 8. LSE payments, GenCo revenues, ISO net surplus, and GenCo net
earnings (i.e., net surplus) during a typical day D for the benchmark 5-bus
test case extended to permit LSE demand to vary from R=0.0 (100% fixed)
to R=1.0 (100% price sensitive)
Fig. 9. Mean outcomes for LSE payments, GenCo revenues, ISO net surplus,
and GenCo net earnings (i.e., net surplus) during day 1000 for the benchmark
5-bus test case extended to include GenCo learning and LSE demand varying
from R=0.0 (100% fixed) to R=1.0 (100% price sensitive)
Consider, for example, the R=0.0 (100% fixed demand)
daily data presented for the benchmark no-learning case in
Fig. 8 and Table II and for the learning case in Fig. 9 and
Table III. Mean LSE payments on day 1000 for the learning
case are $5,040,530.89, an approximately 6.7-fold increase
relative to the benchmark no-learning case. Note, however,
that mean ISO net surplus on day 1000 for the learning case
is then $2,097,620.96, an almost ten-fold increase relative to
the benchmark no-learning case. Indeed, ISO net surplus under
learning is similar in magnitude to GenCo net surplus under
learning ($2,441.646.71).
Since total demand for R=0.0 is the same under learning
and no learning, the ten-fold increase in mean ISO net surplus
under learning implies that the mean LMP paid by the LSEs
is substantially higher than the mean LMP received by the
GenCos. This is due to the approximately six-fold increase
under learning in the mean LMP for bus 2, which has the
largest load (LSE 1) and no generation, and to the much
smaller increases under learning in the mean LMPs for buses
1 and 5, which have generation but no load.
Another regularity observed in Figs. 8 and 9, as well as in
Tables II and III, is that GenCo net surplus, LSE payments, and
ISO net surplus each exhibit a marked monotonic decrease as
R increases from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100%
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GENCO NET SURPLUS, LSE PAYMENTS, AND ISO NET SURPLUS ON A TYPICAL DAY D FOR THE BENCHMARK 5-BUS TEST CASE EXTENDED TO PERMIT
LSE DEMAND TO VARY FROM R=0.0 (100% FIXED) TO R=1.0 (100% PRICE SENSITIVE).
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
Gen1NetEarn(D) 1,556.41 1,412.41 1,316.90 1,239.14 1,193.74 1,145.06
Gen2NetEarn(D) 26.58 10.93 4.30 1.42 1.21 0.43
Gen3NetEarn(D) 56,016.09 35,651.85 21,354.23 11,479.86 2,874.96 2,493.13
Gen4NetEarn(D) 142.27 13.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gen5NetEarn(D) 34,266.94 32,253.34 30,460.22 28,531.08 26,246.37 23,364.36
GenNetSur(D) 92,008.30 69,342.45 53,135.65 41,251.49 30,316.28 27,002.99
TotLSEPay(D) 754,919.61 625,704.76 506,698.47 399,806.50 301,537.97 231,945.71
ISONetSur(D) 209,411.07 184,253.35 159,977.47 131,939.70 93,483.24 43,003.42
TABLE III
MEAN OUTCOMES (WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS) FOR GENCO NET SURPLUS, LSE PAYMENTS, AND ISO NET SURPLUS ON DAY 1000 FOR THE
BENCHMARK 5-BUS TEST CASE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE GENCO LEARNING AND LSE DEMAND VARYING FROM R=0.0 (100% FIXED) TO R=1.0 (100%
PRICE SENSITIVE).
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
Gen1NetEarn(1000) 69,219.61 21,950.82 18,028.37 15,317.64 11,460.38 6,075.72
(64,055.42) (32,888.20) (20,401.49) (17,342.48) (13,341.31) (8,585.60)
Gen2NetEarn(1000) 54,548.72 18,919.31 13,271.49 11,141.69 8,368.95 5,061.87
(57,868.92) (30,102.78) (19,648.72) (15,916.37) (13,528.49) (9,487.15)
Gen3NetEarn(1000) 1,725,216.72 293,743.16 41,122.50 8,213.84 4,059.61 2,316.01
(389,906.14) (269,901.79) (20,776.25) (7,847.69) (3,343.84) (1,775.20)
Gen4NetEarn(1000) 321,907.08 38,678.95 5,589.68 66.32 14.11 3.38
(153,782.17) (73,333.88) (14,969.93) (161.70) (51.51) (18.22)
Gen5NetEarn(1000) 270,754.58 167,938.19 149,920.04 118,535.14 83,774.92 54,920.77
(124,835.20) (113,128.59) (85,701.22) (50,853.37) (32,392.38) (20,700.86)
GenNetSur(1000) 2,441,646.71 541,230.41 227,932.07 153,274.62 107,677.99 68,377.76
(153,782.17) (73,333.88) (14,969.93) (161.70) (51.51) (18.22)
TotLSEPay(1000) 5,040,530.89 1,526,994.60 663,801.01 377,524.06 271,061.40 183,118.99
(1,043,543.03) (975,375.28) (209,686.70) (11,366.32) (26,241.77) (33,324.23)
ISONetSur(1000) 2,097,620.96 647,130.97 206,219.65 57,450.22 31,680.94 14,879.79
(632,303.71) (633,129.12) (197,896.93) (48,696.64) (30,789.07) (11,016.23)
price-sensitive demand). The explanation for this monotonic
decrease is as follows.
Consider, first, the benchmark no-learning case in Table II.
Given low R values, the LSEs have very low price resistance;
their fixed demands constitute the bulk of their total demands.
Around the peak-demand hour 17, due in part to congestion
on branch 1-2, the ISO must dispatch the most expensive
GenCos 3, 4, and 5 to meet the large LSE fixed demand, i.e.,
these GenCos are pivotal suppliers for hour 17. This results
in relatively high LMPs.
As R increases, however, the LSEs are increasingly able to
resist high prices through demand withholding. This results in
lower LMPs, lower total demand, and lower avoidable costs of
production. GenCo revenues and LSE payments are thus lower,
and GenCo net earnings are also lower because the decrease in
GenCo avoidable costs is more than offset by the decrease in
GenCo revenues. Similarly, ISO net surplus is lower because
the decrease in GenCo revenues is more than offset by the
decrease in LSE payments.
Next consider the day-1000 data for the learning case
in Table III. For R=0.0 the mean outcomes for GenCo net
surplus, LSE payments, and ISO net surplus under learning
are substantially greater than their corresponding values under
no learning reported in Table II. As R increases, however, the
mean outcomes for LSE payments and ISO net surplus under
learning both eventually drop below their corresponding values
under no learning, the switch point occurring at R=0.6.
The explanation for these switch points can be deduced
from detailed LMP and total demand findings for the no-
learning and learning cases. When GenCos are learners, low
R values (implying large fixed demands) provide pivotal
suppliers with a substantial opportunity to engage in profitable
economic capacity withholding. This dramatically increases
LMPs relative to the no-learning case, particularly at the load-
only bus 2. Since total demand for the learning case is only
modestly lower than for the no-learning case for low R values,
the end result is substantially greater GenCo revenues, LSE
payments, and ISO net surplus.
On the other hand, as R increases and the LSEs acquire
an increasing ability to resist high prices through demand
withdrawal, the learning GenCos are increasingly forced to
compete with each other for dispatch by lowering their re-
ported marginal costs. This competitive process results in
lower LMPs. However, the LMPs resulting under learning
remain higher than under no learning for all R values, which
in turn induces the LSEs to engage in greater demand with-
holding under learning.
The end result is that mean GenCo revenues, mean LSE
payments, and mean ISO net surplus under learning all fall
below their corresponding no-learning values as R approaches
1.0 due to the relatively strong contraction in total demand
under learning. As can be verified from the GenCo net earnings
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF NET SURPLUS OUTCOMES ON DAY 1000 FOR THE 5-BUS TEST CASE WITHOUT LEARNING (BENCHMARK) VERSUS WITH GENCO
LEARNING (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) AS LSE DEMAND VARIES FROM R=0.0 (100% FIXED) TO R=1.0 (100% PRICE SENSITIVE).
R=0.0 R=0.2 R=0.4 R=0.6 R=0.8 R=1.0
GenNetSur(1000) 92,008.30 69,342.45 53,135.65 41,251.49 30,316.28 27,002.99
LSENetSur(1000) 6,118,410.39 4,937,440.19 3,739,406.53 2,530,696.32 1,317,250.86 95,531.85
ISONetSur(1000) 209,411.07 184,253.35 159,977.47 131,939.70 93,483.24 43,003.42
TNS(1000) 6,419,829.76 5,191,035.99 3,952,519.65 2,703,887.51 1,441,050.38 165,538.26
GenNetSur(1000) 2,441,646.71 541,230.41 227,932.07 153,274.62 107,677.99 68,377.76
(153,782.17) (73,333.88) (14,969.93) (161.70) (51.51) (18.22)
LSENetSur(1000) 1,832,799.11 3,977,731.25 3,494,823.67 2,467,054.80 1,273,364.42 52,119.91
(1,043,543.03) (980,836.96) (231,030.43) (42,475.32) (29,287.77) (24,563.47)
ISONetSur(1000) 2,097,620.96 647,130.97 206,219.65 57,450.22 31,680.94 14,879.79
(632,303.71) (633,129.12) (197,896.93) (48,696.64) (30,789.07) (11,016.23)
TNS(1000) 6,372,006.78 5,166,092.63 3,928,975.39 2,677,779.64 1,412,723.35 135,377.46
TNSLoss(1000) 47,762.98 24,943.36 23,544.27 26,107.87 28,327.03 30,160.80
data provided in Table III, the most expensive GenCo 4 is at
the greatest disadvantage in this competitive process while the
least expensive GenCo 5 is most advantaged.
C. 5-Bus Total Net Surplus Size and Distribution Findings
with Learning and Price-Sensitive Demand
How are total net surplus (TNS) outcomes affected by
LSE demand-bid price sensitivity and by GenCo learning? To
answer this question, LSE net surplus needs to be calculated,
which in turn requires a calculation of LSE benefits from retail
sales as an offset to LSE payments for wholesale purchases.
Recall from Section II-B that each LSE extracts all net sur-
plus from its retail customers under dynamic-price contracts.
For concreteness, suppose the LSEs’ regulated retail-resale
price r on its fixed-price contracts is set at $300/MWh, a value
that strictly exceeds all LMP outcomes determined for the 5-
bus test case in the absence of any upper bound on the LSEs’
willingness to pay for fixed demands. This ensures that this
setting of r has no effect on our previously determined 5-bus
dispatch or LMP solution outcomes.
Under these assumptions, TNS size and distribution out-
comes on day 1000 are reported in Table IV. These outcomes
show that, as the treatment changes from no learning to
learning, and from larger to smaller R values (less price
sensitivity of demand), there is an increasing redistribution of
net surplus away from LSEs and towards GenCos and the ISO.
This redistribution is particularly substantial for the learning
treatment with R=0.0 (100% fixed demand).
The final row of Table IV shows that, for each R value, the
introduction of learning results in a loss of efficiency (reduc-
tion in TNS), particularly so for the case R=0.0. The TNS loss
at R=0.0 is entirely due to out-of-merit-order dispatch resulting
from differential exercise of economic capacity withholding by
differently situated learning GenCos. The TNS loss at positive
R values is due in part to out-of-merit-order dispatch and in
part to a reduction in cleared price-sensitive demand due to the
higher LMPs resulting from economic capacity withholding.
D. 30-Bus ISO Net Surplus Findings
Due to space limitations, we report only a sampling of
results for the 30-bus test case with R=0.0 (100% fixed
demand), both with and without GenCo learning.
As seen in Table V, for the no-learning case the typical ISO
daily net surplus collection is $28,588, and for the learning
case the mean ISO net surplus collection on day 500 is
$53,868.30, nearly double the amount for the no-learning case.
This increase in ISO net surplus under learning is qualitatively
similar to the findings for the 5-bus test case. However, the
size of this increase under learning (an approximate doubling)
is not as large as for the 5-bus test case, a reflection of
the increased rivalry among the more numerous GenCos in
the 30-bus test case that results in a more difficult learning
environment and less economic capacity withholding.
TABLE V
MEAN OUTCOMES (WITH STANDARD DEVIATIONS) FOR GENCO NET
SURPLUS, TOTAL LSE PAYMENTS, AND ISO NET SURPLUS ON DAY 500
FOR THE BENCHMARK 30-BUS TEST CASE WITH R=0.0 (100% FIXED
DEMAND), BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT GENCO LEARNING.
No Learning With Learning
GenNetSur(500) 14,210.01 142,866.39
(67,530.19)
TotLSEPay(500) 110,853.01 285,531.70
(74,214.33)
ISONetSur(500) 28,588.00 53,868.30
(32,322.68)
V. EMPIRICAL COMPARISONS
This section compares the simulated ISO net surplus out-
comes presented in Section IV with data on actual ISO net
surplus outcomes as presented in the market reports [31]– [34]
for PJM, MISO, ISO-NE, and CAISO.
The most complete reporting appears to be provided by
PJM. In [31, Table 2-47, p. 48], the 2008 average cleared
fixed plus price-sensitive demand in the PJM day-ahead market
is given as 76,961 MWh whereas the average cleared price-
sensitive demand in the PJM day-ahead market is given as only
1,846 MWh. This implies an R-ratio equal to R=0.02, which
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is close to R=0.0 (100% fixed demand). In [31, Section 7,
pp. 342)] the total congestion cost is said to “represent the
overall charge or credit to a zone,” which we interpret to
mean the difference between load payments to the ISO and
generation credits (revenues) received from the ISO, i.e., ISO
net surplus. On page 339 the 2008 day-ahead congestion costs
for PJM are given as $2.66 billion. This is approximately 7%
of 2008 total PJM billings, listed as $34.3 billion.
In comparison, consider the simulation outcomes reported
in Table V for our 30-bus test case with R=0.0. For the no-
learning case, the ratio of ISO daily net surplus to total daily
billings, measured as [GenCo daily revenues + LSE daily
payments], is about 15%. For the learning case, the ratio of
ISO daily net surplus to total daily billings is about 10%. The
latter learning-case findings are in line with the 7% empirical
findings for PJM, particularly since total PJM billings include
settlements for black start, ancillary services, reactive services,
Financial Transmission Right (FTR) payouts, Auction Revenue
Right (ARR) credits, and transmission charges in addition to
settlements for load and generation day-ahead trades.
In Fig. 46 (p. 68) of [32, Section V], the 2008 congestion
cost for the MISO day-ahead market is listed as approximately
$500 million. For MISO, the congestion cost associated with
any interface is defined (p. 93) as “the difference in LMP
prices across the interface multiplied by the amount of the
(power) transfer.”
In [33, Section 3.4, p. 70], the combined 2008 Net Con-
gestion Revenue for the ISO-NE real-time and day-ahead
markets is listed as $121 million. The net congestion revenue is
calculated as the product of branch flows and branch shadow
prices.16 In [34, Section 5, p. 5.3(103)], the CAISO inter-
zonal congestion charges for the day-ahead and hour-ahead
markets in year 2008 are listed as $176 million. These charges
are calculated as the product of branch shadow prices and
the branch power flows on a subset of branches connecting
variously specified zones rather than the difference between
load payments and generator revenues across all buses (pricing
locations), as used in this study.
According to the ISO market reports [31]– [34], the ISO
net surplus collections for PJM, MISO, ISO-NE, and CAISO
are largely allocated to FTR/CRR holders. For example, as
reported in [31, p. 417], PJM allocates its total congestion
costs as revenues to FTR holders, including GenCos, LSEs,
and pure speculators with no physical generation or load
obligations. Any extra amount remaining at the end of the
year is allocated to LSEs as payment offsets in accordance
with load-ratio shares. Similarly, as reported in [32, Section
V], MISO distributes its congestion revenues as payments
to FTR holders, including holders of special types of FTRs
created to protect entities with pre-existing agreements to use
the transmission system. Surpluses in one month are used to
fund shortfalls in other months during each year, with FTR
16For a DC-OPF problem formulation (no losses), the ISO net surplus
($/h) collected during any given hour can equivalently be expressed as the
summation across all congested branches of the product of branch shadow
prices ($/MWh) and branch power limits (MW). See, for example, [35, Section
3.2.4, Eqs(3.68-3.71)]. This equivalence does not hold for an AC-OPF problem
formulation.
payments being reduced pro rata if a shortfall persists at the
end of the year.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The basic responsibility undertaken by not-for-profit ISOs
in day-ahead energy markets managed by LMP is to max-
imize total net surplus (TNS) subject to system reliability
and feasibility constraints. An important issue highlighted in
this study is whether this constrained maximization of TNS
properly encourages efficient market operations. As seen in
Section II-B, two concerns arise. First, the ISO must rely on
reported rather than actual GenCo cost and capacity attributes
when calculating TNS. Second, a net surplus dollar accruing
to private traders is weighed equally with a net surplus dollar
accruing to the ISO itself.
The simulation findings in Section IV show that ISO net
surplus can be substantial when LSE demand is predomi-
nately fixed (insensitive to price) and GenCos can learn over
time to strategically report supply offers with higher-than-
true marginal costs. In [36] the authors note that “under the
current ISO practice, the (ISO net surplus) gathered by the
ISO is largely returned to the load and transmission owners,
resembling the government surplus as part of the social surplus
in welfare economics.” However, welfare economists do not
assert the unqualified desirability of assigning government net-
surplus dollars (e.g., tax revenues) the same weight as private
trader net-surplus dollars in market objective functions, as
is done in the ISO TNS objective function (14). An equal
weighting would be especially problematic if the government
were to redistribute its net-surplus dollars to third parties
with high entry barriers and this redistribution effectively
rewarded these third parties for maintaining social costs that
the government hoped to alleviate.
A key issue for the ISO TNS objective function (14) is
whether a dollar flowing to the ISO is properly treated as
having the same social benefit as a dollar flowing to a private
energy trader. The answer surely depends on social opportunity
costs, i.e., on the net social benefits of alternative uses to which
such dollars could be put.
As reported in Section V, the current practice in many U.S.
wholesale power markets under LMP is to use ISO net surplus
collections largely as revenue payments to FTR/CRR holders.
This practice could lead to an overall increase in TNS over the
longer run (i.e., to improved dynamic market efficiency) to the
extent that it either directly or indirectly incentivizes socially
beneficial transmission investments that alleviate congestion.
However, such an outcome is doubtful.
First, the extent to which ISO net surplus payouts to
FTR/CRR holders actually incentivize new transmission in-
vestment is unclear ( [10], [13, Section 4.2]).17 Second,
transmission investment needs can arise for reasons other
than congestion (e.g., the need to reach distributed energy
resources), and congestion might better be alleviated by more
17For example, the CAISO report [10, p. ES-3] reaches the following
conclusion: “...the reality has been that the LMP differences have not provided
enough incentives to upgrade key facilities even after many types of FTRs
and CRRs are provided.”
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local generation rather than by more transmission capacity.
Consequently, the ability of ISO net surplus collections to
appropriately signal the need for new transmission is ques-
tionable in any case. Third, while the social benefits associated
with ISO net surplus payouts to FTR/CRR holders are unclear,
we do have some read on the sizeable nature of the social
costs. Benjamin [37, Section V] empirically estimates that
FTR market imperfections in ISO-NE, NYISO, and PJM from
2006 through 2008 resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars
of additional annual expenses for retail rate-payers in these
energy regions, and that this problem appears to be worsening
over time.
In addition, as seen in Section V, in some energy regions
the ISO net surplus collections not needed for FTR/CRR
payments during a year are used to offset LSE payments. Here,
however, it is important to keep in mind the intended market
efficiency rationale for LMP pricing in relation to demand:
namely, to provide an incentive to LSEs to bid demand into
the system when and where it can be serviced most cheaply.
This incentivization could significantly gain in importance if
retail markets heed growing pressures to introduce advanced
metering and other technologies permitting retail consumers
to better tailor their energy demands to wholesale energy
prices and to choose their retail suppliers [15], [16]. To the
extent that the allocation of ISO net surplus to LSEs as LMP
payment offsets dampens their incentive to minimize these
payments through appropriate retail customer contracting, it
could become an increasing source of social inefficiency in
future years.
Another issue also arises. As seen in Section IV, ISO and
GenCo net surplus collections dramatically increase when
the price-sensitivity of demand is low and learning GenCos
exercise economic capacity withholding. On the other hand,
LSE payments also dramatically increase. This would appear
to provide a desirable incentive to pure LSEs (those without
generation ownership) to support congestion reduction mea-
sures, increased price-sensitivity of demand, and increased
oversight to curtail GenCo withholding. Currently, however,
LSE payments for fixed demand at wholesale are typically
recovered through the resale of this fixed demand at regulated
retail prices. To the extent that LSEs are able to secure timely
increases in these regulated retail prices in step with increases
in wholesale prices, the LSEs are able to largely insulate
themselves from the adverse consequences of higher LMP
payments. In this case no direct participant in the wholesale
power market suffers a loss of net surplus when LMPs increase
due to congestion, fixed demand, and/or GenCo capacity
withholding. Rather, losses in net surplus are borne by retail
consumers. Moreover, barriers to entry into transmission, gen-
eration, and load servicing could then lead to the persistence
over time of socially inefficient wholesale rents, i.e., wholesale
net surplus collections in excess of the amounts needed to
maintain resources in their current productive uses.
Power market researchers recognize that an important goal
of market design is to ensure the alignment of participant
objectives with socially desirable outcomes, thus reducing the
need for oversight of participant behaviors [38]. The main
conclusion drawn from the findings in this study is that ISO
net surplus collections are not well-aligned with efficiency
objectives in ISO-managed wholesale power markets operating
under LMP because they increase in situations unfavorable
to market efficiency. Moreover, the rules currently used to
allocate ISO net surplus collections are not well-aligned with
efficiency objectives because they do not provide an effective
remedy for the underlying conditions inhibiting efficient mar-
ket operation that result in high ISO net surplus collections.
These issues require further study. Particularly important
will be investigations that test the robustness of our findings
for larger-scale power systems, and that consider alternative
wholesale power market designs with improved incentive
alignments should robustness be affirmed.
However, an immediate step that could be taken is increased
transparency and consistency in the public reporting of ISO
financial operations, including ISO net surplus collections and
allocations. Since the Enron disaster, and especially since
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 [39] and the GAO report of
2008 [40], FERC has taken major steps to require increased
reporting accountability by energy companies in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) [41].
Extension of these efforts to require fuller GAAP compli-
ance by the not-for-profit ISOs would help to ensure better
public accountability and easier cross-comparisons. This, in
turn, would enable a more informed public debate regarding
the extent to which ISOs are achieving just and reasonable
outcomes for their market stakeholders and the public at large.
APPENDIX A
DC-OPF PROBLEM FORMULATION
The standard hourly bid/offer-based DC optimal power flow
(DC-OPF) problem formulation for an ISO-managed day-
ahead energy market involves the maximization on day D
of reported total net surplus TNSR for a particular hour H
of day D+1 subject to transmission and generation capacity
constraints in approximate linear form [2]. Total net surplus
refers to the sum of LSE, GenCo, and ISO net surplus. The
qualifier “reported” indicates that the ISO must base its total
net surplus calculation on LSE demand bids and GenCo supply
offers rather than on their true purchase and sale reservation
values, which are not directly observable by the ISO.
As detailed in [42], AMES(V2.05) solves this standard DC-
OPF problem via DCOPFJ, a highly accurate and efficient
DC-OPF module. DCOPFJ wraps a SI/pu data conversion shell
around QuadProgJ, a quadratic programming (QP) solver that
implements the well-known Goldfarb-Idnani dual active set
QP algorithm.
The SI form of the standard DC-OPF problem implemented
in the current study is outlined below making using of the
notation and concepts introduced in Section II. In all treat-
ments, the LSEs in AMES(V2.05) report their true purchase
reservation values (1). Consequently, for no-learning treat-
ments, the objective function TNSR coincides with true total
net surplus (14) based on true purchase and sale reservation
values. However, for GenCo learning treatments, TNSR is
based on reported GenCo sale reservation values (i.e., reported
marginal costs) as given in (6) rather than on true GenCo sale
reservation values (i.e., true marginal costs) as given in (8).
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DC Optimal Power Flow Problem:
max TNSR (16)
with respect to LSE real-power price-sensitive demands,
GenCo real-power generation levels, and voltage angles
pSLj , j = 1, ..., J ; pGi, i = 1, ..., I; δk, k = 1, ...,K (17)
subject to
(i) a real-power balance constraint for each bus k=1,...,K:
∑
i∈Ik
pGi −
∑
j∈Jk
pSLj −
∑
km
Pkm =
∑
j∈Jk
pFLj (18)
where, letting xkm (ohms) denote reactance for branch km,
and Vo denote the base voltage (in line-to-line kV),
Pkm = [Vo]2 · [1/xkm] · [δk − δm]
(ii) a limit on real-power flow for each branch km:
|Pkm| ≤ PUkm (19)
(iii) a real-power operating capacity interval for each GenCo
i = 1,...,I:
CapLi ≤ pGi ≤ CapUi (20)
(iv) a real-power purchase capacity interval for price-sensitive
demand for each LSE j = 1,...,J:
0 ≤ pSLj ≤ SLMaxj (21)
(v) and a voltage angle setting at angle reference bus 1:
δ1 = 0 (22)
This DC-OPF problem can be solved as a strictly concave
quadratic programming problem either by using the bus bal-
ance constraints (18) to substitute out for voltage angles [2,
Section 3.2] or by using an augmented Lagrangian method
[30, p. 288] in which the objective function TNSR in (16)
is augmented with a physically meaningful quadratic penalty
term for the sum of squared voltage-angle differences to
produce a strictly concave objective function with respect to all
of the choice variables (17). The latter augmented Lagrangian
approach is taken in AMES(V2.05).18
18The validity of DC-OPF dispatch and price solutions as approximations
for AC-OPF dispatch and price solutions relies on the assumption that the
voltage angle difference across each branch is small in magnitude [2]. As
detailed in the working paper version of [42], the augmented Lagrangian DC-
OPF solution method implemented in AMES(V2.05) via DCOPFJ permits the
accuracy of this assumption to be directly checked in any given application. In
the current application, with a penalty weight set to 0.05, the sum of squared
voltage-angle differences indeed remained small in magnitude (about 10−2)
throughout all experiments. Moreover, perturbations in this penalty weight
resulted in no discernable effects on DC-OPF dispatch and LMP solutions
through at least three decimal places.
The shadow price (Lagrange multiplier) solution for the real
power balance constraint (18) at bus k, denoted by LMPk,
constitutes the locational marginal price for bus k. By the
well-known envelope theorem, LMPk ($/MWh) measures the
change in the maximized DC-OPF objective function ($/h)
with respect to a change in fixed demand (MW) at bus
k; see [2] for a rigorous discussion. Stated less formally,
LMPk essentially measures the cost of efficiently servicing
an additional MW of fixed demand at bus k.
APPENDIX B
GENCO LEARNING
GenCo learning is implemented using a variant of a stochas-
tic reinforcement learning algorithm developed by Roth and
Erev ( [43], [44]) based on human-subject experiments, here-
after referred to as the VRE learning algorithm. The essential
idea of stochastic reinforcement learning is that the probability
of choosing an action should be increased (reinforced) if the
corresponding reward is relatively good and decreased if the
corresponding reward is relatively poor.
For the study at hand, a supply offer for any GenCo i
takes the form of a linear marginal cost function (6) that
can be summarized by a vector sRi = (a
R
i ,b
R
i ) determining
its ordinate aRi and slope 2b
R
i . Each GenCo i has available an
action domain ADi consisting of a finite number of possible
actions sRi (supply offers). This action domain is tailored to
GenCo i’s own particular true cost and capacity attributes;
e.g., it only contains marginal cost functions (6) lying on
or above GenCo i’s true marginal cost function (8) and
it always contains GenCo i’s true marginal cost function.
However, the action domains are constructed so as to ensure
equal cardinalities and similar densities across all GenCos to
avoid favoring some GenCos over others purely through action
domain construction.19
The remainder of this section describes how an arbitrary
GenCo i goes about using the VRE learning algorithm to
select actions sRi from its action domain ADi to submit to
the ISO for the day-ahead energy market on successive days
D, starting from an initial day D=1. As will be seen below,
the only relevant attribute of ADi for implementation of VRE
learning is that it has finite cardinality. Consequently, letting
Mi ≥ 1 denote the cardinality of ADi, it suffices to index the
actions in ADi by m = 1,...,Mi.
The initial propensity of GenCo i to choose action m ∈
ADi is given by qim(1) for m = 1,...,Mi. AMES(V2.05)
permits the user to set these initial propensity levels to any
real numbers. However, the assumption used in this study is
that GenCo i’s initial propensity levels are all set equal to
some common value qi(1), as follows:
qim(1) = qi(1) for all actions m ∈ ADi (23)
Now consider the beginning of any day D ≥ 1, and suppose
the current propensity of GenCo i to choose action m in ADi
is given by qim(D). The choice probabilities that GenCo i
uses to select an action for day D are then constructed from
19A detailed explanation of this action domain construction can be found
in [28, Appendix B].
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these propensities using the following commonly used Gibbs-
Boltzmann transformation:
pim(D) =
exp(qim(D)/Ti)∑Mi
j=1 exp(qij(D)/Ti)
, m ∈ ADi (24)
In (24), Ti is a temperature parameter that affects the degree to
which GenCo i makes use of propensity values in determining
its choice probabilities. As Ti →∞, then pim(D)→ 1/Mi, so
that in the limit GenCo i pays no attention to propensity values
in forming its choice probabilities. On the other hand, as Ti
→ 0, the choice probabilities (24) become increasingly peaked
over the particular actions m having the highest propensity
values qim(D), thereby increasing the probability that these
actions will be chosen.
At the end of day D, the current propensity qim(D) that
GenCo i associates with each action m in ADi is updated in
accordance with the following rule. Let m′ denote the action
actually selected and reported into the day-ahead market by
GenCo i in day D. Also, let NEim′(D) denote the actual daily
net earnings (11) attained by GenCo i at the end of day D
as its settlement payment for all 24 hours of the day-ahead
market for day D+1. Then, for each action m in ADi,
qim(D+1) = [1− ri]qim(D) + Responseim(D) , (25)
Responseim(D) =
 [1− ei] ·NEim
′(D) if m = m′
ei · qim(D)/[Mi − 1] if m 6= m′,
(26)
where20 ri ∈ [0, 1], ei ∈ [0, 1), and m 6= m′ implies Mi ≥
2. The introduction of the recency parameter ri in (25) acts
as a damper on the growth of the propensities over time. The
experimentation parameter ei in (26) permits reinforcement to
spill over to some extent from a chosen action to other actions
to encourage continued experimentation with various actions
in the early stages of the learning process.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful to J. Lin, E. Litvinov, J. McCalley,
R. O’Neill, A. Papalexopoulos, J. Price, P. Sircar, and four
anonymous referees for helpful comments and pointers to data.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Joskow, “Markets for power in the United States: An interim assess-
ment,” The Energy Journal, vol. 27, no. 1, 1–36, 2006.
[2] H. Liu, L. Tesfatsion, and A. A. Chowdhury, “Derivation of locational
marginal prices for restructured wholesale power markets,” Journal of
Energy Markets, vol. 2, no. 1, 3–27, 2009.
[3] L. Tesfatsion,“Auction basics for restructured wholesale power markets:
Objectives and pricing rules,” Proceedings of the IEEE Power and
Energy Society General Meeting, Calgary, Alberta, CA, July 2009.
www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/AuctionBasics.IEEEPES2009.LT.pdf
20In the original Roth-Erev algorithm, the term qim(D) in (26) is instead
given by NEim′ (D). However, as explained in [45], in this case there is no
updating of propensities when net earnings outcomes are zero, e.g., due to
a failure to be dispatched. This can result in prolonged mushing around in
the early stages of learning when GenCos are trying to learn appropriate
supply offers, with subsequent losses of net earnings and reductions in
market efficiency. The substitution of qim(D) for NEim′ (D) in equation (26),
introduced in [45] to avoid this zero-updating problem, resulted in dramatic
improvements in both GenCo net earnings and in market efficiency.
[4] E. Hausman, R. Fagan, D. White, K. Takahashi, and A. Napoleon,
“LMP electricity markets: Market operations, market power, and value
for consumers,” Synapse Energy Economics, February 2006.
[5] G. Gross and E. Bompard, “Optimal power flow application issues in the
pool paradigm,” Elect. Pow. and Energy Sys., vol. 26, 787-796, 2004.
[6] D. Kirschen and G. Strbac, Fundamentals of Pow. Econ., Wiley, 2004.
[7] A. Somani and L. Tesfatsion, “An agent-based testbed study of wholesale
power market performance measures,” IEEE Computational Intelligence
Magazine, vol. 3, no. 4, 56-72, 2008.
[8] G. B. Aldete, “Alternative models to analyze market power and financial
transmission rights in electricity markets,” Ph.D. Thesis, Department of
Electrical and Comp. Eng. U. of Waterloo, Ontario, 2005.
[9] H. Li and L. Tesfatsion, “The AMES wholesale power market testbed: A
computational laboratory for research, teaching, and training,” Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, July 2009.
www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/AMESTestBed.2009IEEEPESGM.pdf
[10] Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology, California Indepen-
dent System Operator (CAISO), June 2004. www.caiso.com/docs/2004/
06/03/2004060313241622985.pdf
[11] H. Liu, Y. Shen, Z. Zabinsky, C.C. Liu, A. Courts, and S.K. Joo, “Social
welfare maximization in transmission enhancement considering network
congestion”, IEEE Trans. Pow. Sys., vol. 23, 1105-1114, 2008.
[12] R. Walawalkar, S. Blumsack, J. Apt, and S. Fernands, “An economic
welfare analysis of demand response in the PJM electricity market,”
Energy Policy, vol. 36, 3692-3702, 2008.
[13] S. Oren and G. Gross, “Economic impact assessment of transmis-
sion enhancement projects,” Final Report, PSERC Publication 09-07,
September 2009.
[14] L. L. Kiesling, “The role of retail pricing in electricity restructuring,”
pp. 39-62 in A. N. Kleit, Electric choices: Deregulation and the future
of electric power, Rowman & Littlefield, NY, 2007.
[15] FERC, Assessment of demand response and advanced metering, Staff
Report, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, December 2008.
[16] “The choice is yours: Demand response,” IEEE Power and Energy
Society Magazine, vol. 8, no. 3, May/June 2010.
[17] S. Raikar and M. Ilic´, “Assessment of transmission congestion for major
electricity markets in the US,” MIT EL 01-009 Working Paper, Energy
Laboratory, MIT, February 2001.
[18] M. Dworkin and R. Goldwasser, “Ensuring consideration of the public
interest in the governance and accountability of regional transmission
organizations,” Energy Law J., vol. 28, no. 2, 543-601, 2007.
[19] AMES Wholesale Power Market Testbed Homepage www.econ.iastate.
edu/tesfatsi/AMESMarketHome.htm
[20] IEEE Task Force on Open Source Software for Power Systems
ewh.ieee.org/cmte/psace/CAMS taskforce/index.htm
[21] MISO, Energy and Operating Reserve Markets, Business Practices
Manual No. 002, Effective Date: January 6, 2009.
[22] MISO, Energy Market Instruments, Business Practices Manual No. 003,
Effective Date: April 1,2008.
[23] ISO-NE, Market Operations, ISO New England Inc., Revision: 32,
Effective Date: July 1, 2009.
[24] R. Baldick and W. Hogan,“Capacity constrained supply function equilib-
rium models of electricity markets: Stability, non-decreasing constraints,
and function space iterations,” University of California Energy Institute
PWP-089, Aug. 2002. www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ucei/PDF/pwp089.pdf
[25] R. Baldick, R. Grant, and E. Kahn, “Theory and application of linear
supply function equilibrium in electricity markets,” Journal of Regula-
tory Economics, vol. 25(2), pp. 143-167, 2004.
[26] H. Salazar, A critical appraisal of economic-driven transmission en-
hancement, M.S. Creative Component, ISU Econ. Dept., Nov. 2008.
[27] T. Orfanogianni and G. Gross, “A general formulation for LMP evalu-
ation,” IEEE Trans. Pow. Sys., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 1163–1173, 2007.
[28] H. Li, J. Sun, and L. Tesfatsion, “Separation and volatility of loca-
tional marginal prices in restructured wholesale power markets,” ISU
Economics Working Paper #09009, June 2009. www.econ.iastate.edu/
research/publications/viewabstract.asp?pid=13075
[29] J. Lally, “Financial transmission rights: Auction example,” Section 6
in Financial Transmission Rights Draft 01-10-02, m-06 ed., ISO New
England, Inc., January 2002.
[30] M. Shahidehpour, H. Yamin, and Z. Li, Market Operations in Electric
Power Systems, New York, NY: IEEE/Wiley-Interscience, 2002.
[31] PJM, 2008 State of the Market Report, Vol. 2: Detailed Analysis,
Monitoring Analytics, LLC, Independent Market Monitor for PJM,
March 11, 2009. www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM State of
the Market/2008/2008 som-pjm volume2.pdf
15
[32] MISO, 2008 State of the Market Report for the Midwest ISO, Potomac
Economics, Independent Market Monitor for the Midwest ISO, July 21,
2009. www.midwestiso.org/publish/Document/
[33] ISO-NE, 2008 Annual Markets Report in ISO New England, Independent
Market Monitoring Unit, ISO New England, Inc., June 2009. www.
iso-ne.com/markets/mktmonmit/rpts/other/amr08 final 061709.pdf
[34] CAISO, Market Issues & Performance, 2008 Annual Report, Depart-
ment of Market Monitoring, California Independent System Operator
Corporation, April 2009. www.caiso.com/2390/239087966e450.pdf
[35] H. Liu, Myth of locational marginal price unleashed, M.S. Economics
Creative Component, Iowa State University, May 2008.
[36] E. Litvinov, F. Zhao, and T. Zheng, “Alternative auction objectives and
pricing schemes in short-term electricity markets,” Proceedings of the
IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, Calgary, Canada, July
2009.
[37] R. Benjamin, A further inquiry into FTR properties, Report, Round Table
Group, Inc., February 2010.
[38] E. Sauma and S. Oren, “Do generation firms in restructured electricity
markets have incentives to support social-welfare-improving transmis-
sion investments?”, Energy Economics, vol. 31, 676-689, 2009.
[39] Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law 109-58, 109th Congress, August
8, 2005. http://www.epa.gov/oust/fedlaws/publ 109-058.pdf
[40] GAO, Electricity restructuring: FERC could take additional steps to
analyze regional transmission organizations’ benefits and performance,
United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Com-
mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
GAO-08-987, September 2008.
[41] M. Lewis, FERC compliance: A legal and business guide, Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C., 2009.
[42] J. Sun and L. Tesfatsion, “Open-source software for power industry
research, teaching, and training: A DC-OPF illustration,” Proceedings
of the IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, Tampa,
Florida, June 2007. Working Paper Version: www.econ.iastate.edu/
tesfatsi/DC-OPF.JSLT.pdf
[43] A. E. Roth and E. Ido, “Learning in extensive form games: Experimental
data and simple models in the intermediate term,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 8, pp. 164–212, 1995.
[44] I. Erev and A. E. Roth, “Predicting how people play games with
unique mixed-strategy equilibria,” American Economic Review, vol. 88,
pp. 848–881, 1998.
[45] J. Nicolaisen, V. Petrov, and L. Tesfatsion, “Market power and efficiency
in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction
pricing,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 5, no. 5,
October 2001, pp. 504–523.
Hongyan Li received his M.S. degree in Electric Power Systems from Xi’an
Jiaotong University (China) in 1997 and worked as an engineer for the Sifang
& Huaneng Power System Control Corporation (China) for seven years. In
December 2009 he received his Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Computer
Engineering from Iowa State University, and in January 2010 he joined ABB
Inc. (North Carolina) as an Engineering Consultant. His principal research
area is power system economics, with a particular focus on the efficiency and
reliability of restructured wholesale power markets.
Leigh Tesfatsion received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University
of Minnesota in 1975. She is Professor of Economics, Mathematics, and
Electrical and Computer Engineering at Iowa State University. Her principal
research area is agent-based testbed development, with a particular focus on
restructured electricity markets. She is an active participant in various IEEE
PES committees focusing on power economics issues and a co-organizer and
director of the ISU Electric Energy Economics (E3) Group. She serves as
associate editor for a number of journals, including J. of Energy Markets.
